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R ECENTLY, a trend in judicial opinions addressing mental
health law issues has developed which authorizes the use of a
psychiatrist as the neutral and independent decisionmaker man-
dated by due process requirements. The Supreme Court has been
the prime mover behind this development,1 and the lower courts
have been quick to adopt it,2 at least in some form. The use of a
psychiatric decisionmaker raises many serious and interesting
questions that have received scant attention by the commentators3
and the courts. This Article will explore some of these questions.
In many respects, this approval of psychiatric decisionmakers
need not be viewed as a radical departure from the past. In the
first place, as the Court has recently made clear,4 due process does
not necessarily require that hearing officers be persons trained as
attorneys. 5 Moreover, it generally has been recognized that psy-
chiatric witnesses have a great influence on judicial decisions con-
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. A.B., Kenyon College,
1970; J.D., University of Chicago, 1973. I would like to thank my colleagues Lee Albert,
Phil Halpern, and Jack Schlegel for their helpful suggestions. I also want to thank Neil
Dickson for his fine research assistance.
1. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-16 (1979).
2. See, e.g., Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1981); Boarding Home
Advocacy Team, Inc. v. O'Bannon, 525 F. Supp. 1181, 1190-91 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
3. Of course, there have been numerous articles on the various specific issues that
arise in these cases which address some of these questions within those specific contexts.
See, e.g., Garvey, Children and the Idea of Liberty: A Comment on the Civil Commitment Cases, 68
Ky. L.J. 809, 826-30 (1980); Rhoden, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARv. G.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 363, 406-08 (1980); Silverstein, Civil Commitment of Minors: Due and Undue
Process, 58 N.C.L. REv. 1133, 1143-48 (1980); Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive
Alternative Analysis and the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REv.
375, 439-42 (1981).
4. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 199 n.14 (1982).
5. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 (1975) (school official); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418




cerning mental health issues, almost to the point that the psychia-
trists are de facto decisionmakers.6 Still, the current judicial
delegation of authority to psychiatric decisionmakers raises special
issues that should be considered separately. Unlike most other
non-attorney "hearing" officers, psychiatrists bring with them
their own professional mode of decisionmaking, one that is quite
different from the one found in the adversarial judicial process.
The explicit use of psychiatrists as decisionmakers entails a deci-
sionmaking process which is procedurally and substantively dis-
tinct from that entailed by the use of psychiatrists as mere wit-
nesses, regardless of how influential the psychiatrists' testimony
may be. Although many of the same questions arise, albeit in a
different form, additional questions- surface when the psychiatrist
explicitly assumes the decisionmaker role. How is the psychiatrist
expected to act in this role? How is the expertise to be employed?
Which profession's standards of decisionmaking will govern the
conduct of the psychiatric decisionmaker-those of the law or
those of medicine? What form of adversary proceeding, if any,
must be used? What are the essential minimal requirements to be
met by a due process decisionmaker and how should these be ap-
plied to the pyschiatric expert? These questions themselves are
but part of the broader considerations concerning the division of
decisionmaking responsibility among different professions and the
manner in which specialized expertise can and should be used in
the decisionmaking process.
This Article's discussion of these issues begins with an analysis
of the various cases that have sanctioned employing a psychiatrist
as a due process decisionmaker. The different contexts in which
these courts explicitly or implicity authorize the use of the psychi-
atric decisionmaker, especially in the adversarial context, are ex-
amined. The broader question of the alternative ways in which
psychiatric expertise might be used in the decisionmaking process
is then explored. It is shown that serious problems arise whichever
role the psychiatric decisionmaker takes, whether it be the tradi-
6. See Albers, Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony:
The Fallibility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 11 (1977); Morse,
Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL L. REV. 527,
536 n.16 (1978), and numerous sources cited therein. But see Miller & Fiddleman, Involun-
tary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Results of the 1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C.L,
REv. 985, 1004 n.89 (1982).
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tional passive decisionmaker in an adversary context, the deci-
sionmaker who is completely outside of the adversary context, or
some compromise role between these two.
Next, the Article considers whether the psychiatric deci-
sionmaker acting in any or all of these different roles satisfies the
essential minimum requirements of due process. This necessitates
a brief discussion of the ultimate purposes of the traditional due
process protections, wherein two major values-broadly stated as
accuracy and participation-are identified as those which due pro-
cess provisions try to enhance. Against this general framework,
the more specific requirements placed on adjudicatory-type deci-
sionmakers are measured. These requirements-basically neutral-
ity and independence-are the embodiment of the formal concept
of the minimum essential attributes of a proper decisionmaker. As
such, they are an appropriate set of guidelines for the assessment
of the varying uses of the psychiatric decisionmaker. With respect
to each of these various specific requirements, the following issues
are discussed: whether the particular requirement needs to be ap-
plied to the different situation of the psychiatric decisionmaker;
whether a psychiatric decisionmaker can meet this requirement;
and whether the psychiatric profession provides a sufficient alter-
native means of accomplishing the goal of the provision. The con-
clusion reached is that psychiatrists meet the presently recognized
due process requirements for neutral and independent deci-
sionmakers, despite the fact that the use of psychiatric deci-
sionmakers raises questions about neutrality and independence,
especially as these provisions relate to passivity.
In the final Section, this Article addresses the appropriate
role of expertise in the decisionmaking process and whether there
are issues beyond neutrality and independence that should cause
one to be wary of using psychiatrists as decisionmakers. The con-
tention that psychiatrists do not possess sufficient expertise on the
issues to be decided in these proceedings is considered, but it is
recognized that the profession with the most expertise on these
matters is psychiatry and therefore psychiatrists must play some
role in the process. Still, it is argued that there is a real need to
place some restrictions on the use of this expertise. This leads to a
discussion of possible external controls on decisionmakers. In this
context, various standards of "accuracy," including those of the
''scientific expert" and of the "reasonable man," are considered.
6831984]
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It is concluded that, in many cases, there is a need for an external
check on the psychiatric expert because the very expertise of that
profession is also a type of bias. Finally, it is suggested that the
form that this external control on psychiatric expertise should
take is to have the psychiatrist testify as a witness and have the
actual decisionmaker be the non-specialist judge.
I. THE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC DECISIONMAKERS
A. Judicial Formulations
The prime example and seminal instance of using a psychia-
trist to act as a due process decisionmaker is the Supreme Court's
opinion in Parham v. J.R.7 In Parham, the Court was faced with a
due process challenge to state procedures whereby juveniles could
be "voluntarily" committed to public mental hospitals by their
parents." The plaintiffs were children who contended that they
had a right to have the question of whether they required hospi-
talization determined in an adversary proceeding. The majority
concluded that these minors do have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest under the due process clause.9
The real significance of the opinion for present purposes is its
discussion of what minimum process is due. Some "inquiry" by a
"neutral fact-finder" was deemed necessary, but the majority held
that an independent medical evaluation of the child's need for
hospitalization by a staff physician of the admitting hospital would
be sufficient:
Due process has never been thought to require that the neutral and de-
tached trier of fact be law trained or a judicial or administrative officer.
Surely, this is the case as to medical decisions, for 'neither judges nor admin-
istrative hearing officers are better qualified than psychiatrists to render psy-
chiatric judgments.' Thus, a staff physician will suffice, so long as he or she is
free to evaluate independently the child's mental and emotional condition
and need for treatment.10
7. 442 U.S. 584 (1978).
8. See generally Garvey, supra note 3; Silverstein, supra note 3; Szasz, The Child as Invol-
untary Mental Patient: The Threat of Child Therapy to the Child's Dignity, Privacy, and Self-
Esteem, 14 SAN DiEro L. REV. 1005 (1977).
9. Parham, 442 U.S. at 600-01.
10. Id. at 607 (citations omitted) (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970)).
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 942,
569 P.2d 1286, 1299, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 311 (1977) (Clark, J., dissenting)).
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In addition, the Court decided that this inquiry need not take the
form of any type of judicial-style hearing.
It is not necessary that the deciding physician conduct a formal or quasi-
formal hearing. A state is free to require such a hearing, but due process is
not violated by use of informal traditional medical investigative techniques.
Since well-established medical procedures already exist, we do not undertake
to outline with specificity precisely what this investigation must involve. The
mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of
judges. What is best for a child is an individual medical decision that must be
left to the judgment of physicians in each case. We do no more than empha-
size that the decision should represent an independent judgment of what the
child requires and that all sources of information that are traditionally relied
on by physicians and behavioral specialists should be consulted."
Two aspects of this unusual approach to minimal due process
safeguards should be recognized. First, the Court sanctioned the
use of an expert decisionmaker in place of a judicial or adminis-
trative hearing official. Second, the Court indicated that an adju-
dicative-type adversary hearing is not the only form of decision-
making that is encompassed within the concept of due process.
Not surprisingly, these two aspects overlap and reinforce each
other to a considerable degree. If the decision is made solely on
the basis of medical diagnostic procedures, it should be made by a
trained physician. Conversely, if the decision is to be made by a
trained physician, it. should be done in accordance with the meth-
ods for which the physician is trained.
Despite the obvious connection between these two concepts,
they should be carefully distinguished. The psychiatric deci-
sionmaker need not always be used completely outside of the ad-
versary process. Parham, for example, presented a special situation
necessitating restrictions on the use of an adversary hearing prior
to hospitalization because of the danger of significant harm to the
parent-child relationship resulting from the parents and child be-
ing opponents in an adversary hearing.12 Even the dissenters
agreed on that point,13 although they .believed a post-admission
hearing should be required because the doctors would then be the
child's adversaries.
1 4
11. 422 U.S. at 607-08.
12. Id. at 610.
13. Id. at 633. The dissenters only agreed regarding commitments by parents rather
than juvenile authorities. Id. at 637-38.
14. Id. at 633-37. The evidence at this post-admission hearing presumably would in
1984] 685
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Both aspects of Parham have been adopted by at least one
court where there were no special dangers that might result from
the requested adversary hearing itself.15 However, other cases
which have followed Parham have split these two aspects. They
raise even more distinctly the questions of whether the psychiatric
decisionmaker should be seen as meeting traditional notions of
neutrality and independence and how the psychiatric deci-
sionmaker is to operate. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself appears
to have approved the use of an expert psychiatric decisionmaker
in a far different type of proceeding. In Vitek v. Jones,1 6 the Court
agreed with a district court's conclusion that due process required
an adversary hearing before a prisoner could be transferred to a
mental hospital. Numerous elements of the adversary process, in-
cluding the right to present testimony and cross-examine wit-
nesses, were mandated.17 The Court was careful to note, however,
that the district court's order did not require that the indepen-
dent decisionmaker come from outside the prison or hospital ad-
ministration.18 Presumably this envisions the possibility of using a
psychiatrist as the decisionmaker. 19
More explicit on this point is Doe v. Gallinot,20 which held that
a mandatory probable cause hearing was required by the due pro-
cess clause for persons involuntarily committed under California's
"gravely disabled" statutory scheme. These California provisions
allowed a person to be declared "gravely disabled" due to mental
disease and "committed to a mental institution for 72 hours on an
emergency basis, and up to 14 more days for involuntary treat-
ment, with no requirement that the state initiate a hearing before
an independent tribunal to determine whether adequate cause for
commitment exists."' 21 The Ninth Circuit held that there must be
most cases involve little more than testimony by mental health professionals.
15. Boarding Home Advocacy Team, Inc. v. O'Bannon, 525 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (fourteenth amendment deprivation was assumed to exist for purposes of discussion
only).
16. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
17. Id. at 494-95.
18. Id. at 496.
19. The district judge did state that the "examining or treating physician should not
be permitted to vote on the commitment decision." Miller v. Vitek, 437 F. Supp. 569, 574
(D. Neb. 1977). This shows a recognition of the use of a psychiatric decisionmaker, but one
not involved in the initial decision. See discussion infra notes 116-24.
20. 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981).
21. Id. at 1019.
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"an independent evaluation, by a neutral decisionmaker," but
stated that a decisionmaker within the institution could be used,22
and that this person need not be a judicial officer.23 On remand,
the district court clarified the context in which the psychiatric
decisionmaker could be employed. The probable cause hearing
must provide all of the due process procedures required at a hear-
ing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,24 and the deci-
sionmaker must "give a written statement as to the evidence re-
lied on and the reasons for the involuntary detention for mental
health treatment. ' 25 The independent decisionmaker who would
conduct this hearing and give this statement could be a medical
doctor, a judicial officer, or an administrative law judge.2 6
There are also uses of the psychiatric decisionmaker that fall
somewhere between those of Parham and Doe. An illustration of
this is provided by the current and often confusing judicial debate
over the method of dealing with a patient's right to refuse psycho-
tropic medication in non-emergency situations. One of the first
courts to address this issue was the federal district court in Rennie
v. Klein.28 This case relied upon Parham but created its own proce-
dure for using a psychiatric decisionmaker.29 The issue was
whether an involuntarily hospitalized patient had a right to refuse
to receive psychotropic medication. The court found that such a
right exists as an aspect of the right to privacy, but that the right
to refuse can be overcome by considerations of whether the re-
fusal is a result of the underlying mental illness and whether less
22. Id. at 1024.
23. Id. at 1025.
24. These appear to be the full rights of a formal adversary legal proceeding. See gen-
erally CAL WE .F. & INST. CODE §§ 5275-5276 (West 1984).
25. Doe v. Gallinot, No. CU76-107-F, slip op. (C.D. Cal Jan. 20, 1982).
26. A "court appointed commissioner or referee" was a fourth possibility. Interest-
ingly, the court also approved using "a licensed clinical social worker with a minimum of
10 years' experience in mental health." January 20, 1982, order at 2. This is an extension
of the "psychiatric decisionmaker" concept to another mental health profession and shows
a recognition of the reality of mental health care especially in state hospitals. One wonders,
however, how the licensed clinical psychologists managed to be left off the list.
27. See generally Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8
BuLL AM. ACAD. PSYCHO.OGY & L 179 (1980); Rhoden, supra note 3; Zlotnick, supra note
3.
28. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978) (motion for preliminary injunction denied), 476
F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979) (complaint amended to add class action on behalf of all per-
sons hospitalized).
29. See Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1307-08.
6871984]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
intensive forms of therapy can be used instead.3 0 The court held
that this qualified right constitutes "a sufficient liberty interest so
that due process attaches"$1 and that an independent psychiatrist
should be the ultimate decisionmaker on the issue of whether the
right to refuse should be recognized and upheld.3 2 This psychia-
trist was required to conduct a hearing, but only "an informal




In this context, a patient must be provided with a non-attorney
patient-advocate to serve as "informal counsel" at the "informal
hearing.13 4 These procedural aspects of the district court decision
were overturned by the Third Circuit, however, which found that
the only process necessary is a series of informal consultations fol-
lowed by a review of the treatment decision by the hospital's med-
ical director.3 5 This decision is still to be made by the psychiatrist,
but presumably only by whatever procedural means the psychia-
trist deems appropriate.36 The First Circuit, in contrast, has re-
quired that there be some formal finding of incompetency, appar-
ently by a judicial decisionmaker, before medication can be
involuntarily administered; thus, this court has not endorsed any
use of a psychiatric decisionmaker to resolve the general question
of whether a particular patient has the capacity to exercise a right
to refuse medication.
3 7
These cases raise many interesting questions about the use of
psychiatric decisionmakers. Perhaps the most fundamental one is
how the courts decide in the first place that a particular decision is
one that should be made by a psychiatrist. The short and simple
answer found in the judicial opinions is that the decision is a medi-
cal one and thus should be made by doctors. 3 The simplicity of
30. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1144-47.
31. Id. at 1147.
32. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1312.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1311.
35. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 848-51 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
36. See id. at 851.
37. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 660 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom,
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). A rather unusual decisionmaking role for the psychi-
atrist was envisioned in Rogers: nontreating physicians would review "the full treatment
history of [incompetent] patients to ensure that the treating physicians are in fact attempt-
ing to make treatment decisions as the patients would were they competent." 634 F.2d at
661. This is a rather strange use of expert decisionmaking. See discussion infra at note 179.
38. E.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979).
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this answer has some appeal. But its inadequacy lies in that same
simplicity. One cannot abstractly say that a decision is a medical
one or a legal one without begging the question. Labeling a deci-
sion "medical" in this context is no more than a short-hand way
of saying that the decisionmaker should be a medical expert who
will, to some degree, use the methods of the medical profession to
arrive at the decision. Even if one were to agree that the expertise
of doctors must enter the decisionmaking process at some point,
this does not demonstrate that a decision should be labeled a med-
ical one. Numerous decisions that are labeled "legal" require the
use of medical expertise for their resolution. 9 The underlying
questions remain the same no matter which label they are given.
Should this child be placed in a mental hospital? Should this per-
son be hospitalized as "gravely disabled"? Should this patient re-
ceive medication over his objections? These questions must be de-
cided in the most accurate way possible,40 but there is no abstract
notion of accuracy to be consulted. The question is whether accu-
racy is to be viewed from the perspective of the medical profes-
sion, the legal profession, or neither.4' The labels placed upon
these decisions are themselves derived from determining whether
psychiatrists or lawyer/judges are "best" able to decide what
should be done with this child or patient.
A better way to approach these matters is to ask how exper-
tise should be used in the decisionmaking process. Medical exper-
39. In a case involving injuries sustained from a dog bite, the judgment was reversed
for insufficient expert medical testimony, the court stating that "where injuries complained
of are of such character as to require skilled and professional persons to determine cause
and extent thereof, the question is one of science and must necessarily be determined by
testimony of skilled, professional persons." Spivey v. Atteberry, 205 Okla. 493, 494, 238
P.2d 814, 816 (1951). See also Hart v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 31 Or. App. 181, 184, 570
P.2d 92, 93-94 (1977) (workmen's compensation).
40. Although under an ideal adjudicatory system each particular case would be de-
cided "accurately," people often are willing to settle for a system that results in some inac-
curacy provided that the system provides safeguards against inaccurate decisions in specific
types of cases. For instance, if one thinks preventing hospitalization of those who do not
require it is more important than getting hospitalization for those who do, or vice versa,
one might establish a system that has more overall inaccuracy than an alternative system
because it errs on the side of preventing the type of wrong decision one finds more troub-
ling. Indeed, psychiatrists are trained to err on the side of finding illness, as opposed to
rejecting it. See Livermore, Malmquist & Mehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117
U. PA. L. Rav. 75, 77 (1968).
41. See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
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tise is relevant to and must inform the decision in such cases,42 but
certain questions remain. What form of proceeding and decision-
making should be used? What are the possible uses of the exper-
tise? What difficulties, if any, arise from these uses? These ques-
tions are addressed in the following Sections.
B. Psychiatric Expertise in the Decisionmaking Process
Unlike the role of the psychiatrist being discussed here, the
psychiatric expert is used normally as an expert witness in the for-
mal decisionmaking process. 43 The psychiatrist offers an opinion
on the medical questions relevant to the issue at hand in order to
assist the actual decisionmaker. Normally, this is done within the
context of an adversary hearing. Although the psychiatrist is only
a witness, this expert opinion is so crucial and so related to the
"ultimate issue" that in many cases the psychiatrist can be seen as
actually sharing in the decisionmaking process.4 Moreover, the
psychiatric expert's degree of participation in the adversary aspect
of the proceeding can vary.
At one extreme are systems whereby the expert testifies solely
on behalf of one of the parties and is forced to testify in the un-
natural stylized manner of expert testimony developed by the le-
gal system.4 At the other end of the spectrum are the possibilities
provided by more modern evidentiary rules wherein psychiatrists
testify as court-appointed experts in a manner comfortable to
them, basing their opinions on information normally relied upon
in their profession .4  Although this testimony occurs within the
context of an adversary hearing with the parties being given an
opportunity to cross-examine the expert, 7 there is a qualitative
difference in the adversary nature of the expert's participation. As
court-appointed experts, psychiatrists are not even identified with
42. See infra text accompanying note 169.
43. There are, of course, other possible ways of using expertise in the decisionmaking
process. See Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-type Hearings for Resolving Complex Sci-
entific, Economic and Social Issues, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 111, 126-27 (1972); Leventhal, Environ-
mental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 546-59 (1974).
44. See supra note 6.
45. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 14, 15 (2d ed. 1972),
46. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 703, 704, 705, 706.
47. FED. P, EViD. 706 provides for cross-examination, as do most states, although
Alaska appa-rently makes it discretionary. ALASKA R. EVID. 706. See D. LOUISELL & C. MunL-
LER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 404, at 725-26 & Supp. at 250-51.
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one particular party. They take on much more of the perceived
neutrality and independence associated with the actual deci-
sionmaker and, in effect, have an even larger share of the deci-
sionmaking role than experts testifying on behalf of a particular
party. This is probably a mixed blessing. When allowed to rely
more upon the language and accepted practices of one's own pro-
fession, an expert not only is more removed from the adversary
nature of the legal system, but is even further removed from the
strictures imposed by this system.48
A similar but even more dramatic difference exists when the
psychiatrist is actually used as the decisionmaker. One possibility is
allowing the psychiatrist to come to decisions solely on the basis of
his or her own observations and expertise. None of the primary
characteristics of the adversary system would be used. The deci-
sion would be reached only by using those methods normally em-
ployed by the psychiatric profession to arrive at such a decision.
This is apparently the situation envisioned by the majority in
Parham.
Alternatively, there is a possibility that the expert could sim-
ply be used as a decisionmaker in the context of a complete adver-
sary hearing. The parties would have the right to be represented
by counsel, to call witnesses, and to cross-examine each other's
witnesses. The psychiatrist would have to prepare a written state-
ment of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the decision.
Thus, while a psychiatrist would be the decisionmaker, the formal
process the decisionmaker would employ would be that of the le-
gal system. This is the situation created by the district court in Doe
v. Gallinot.
Falling somewhere between these two possibilities is the psy-
chiatric decisionmaker envisioned by the district court in Rennie.
Rather than allowing the expert to use only the methodology of
the psychiatric profession, a hearing requirement would be added,
albeit an "informal hearing" with only "informal counsel." The
psychiatric decisionmaker would have to act in a somewhat
strange professional role, but would not have to rely solely upon a
48. For criticisms of the use of'impartial experts, see Diamond, The Fallacy of the Im-
partial Expert, 3 ARCHIVES CRIM. PSYCHODYNAMICS 221 (1959); Goldstein, The Psychiatrist
and the Legal Process: The Proposals for an Impartial Expert and for Preventive Detention, 33
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 123, 123-28 (1963); Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Revisited,




Serious issues arise with regard to each of these different ways
of using psychiatric decisionmakers. In many respects, the place-
ment of the psychiatrist as decisionmaker within the complete ad-
versary process as done in Doe creates the most troubling situa-
tion. In what way is the expertise to be used? Would the
psychiatrist simply act as the traditional passive decisionmaker
who does no independent investigation? Alternatively, would the
psychiatrist hear the parties and their witnesses, but then make an
investigation (examination) "outside of the record"?
If the psychiatrist remains a passive decisionmaker, why
should an expert even be used as the decisionmaker? Of course,
expert decisionmakers who remain relatively passive are used in
adversary proceedings in other contexts.49 But unlike the possible
use of such decisionmakers in a patent case concerning a techni-
cally confusing matter" or even an environmental case involving a
complex engineering process, 51 psychiatric expertise is not needed
in order for the decisionmaker to be able to comprehend ade-
quately the basic issues in the case-that is, the arguments
presented to support the claim for the need to hospitalize a mi-
nor. How, then, is the expertise useful if the psychiatrists do not
make their own examination? Perhaps the psychiatrists are ex-
pected simply to draw upon their own expert knowledge and in-
formation about people and mental illnesses in general. Given the
extent to which psychiatric diagnosis and prognosis is based on
clinical evaluation52 rather than on "objective" test findings,53 this
49. For a recent discussion of various specialized courts, see Jordan, Specialized Courts:
A Choice?, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 745 (1981). See also Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals
Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S.
CAL L. Rxv. 761, 775-91 (1983).
50. See Marovitz, Patent Cases in the District Courts-Who Should Hear Them?, 51 IND.
L.J. 374 (1976); Gelfand, Expanding the Role of the Patent Office in Determining Patent Validity:
A Proposal, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 75, 103 (1979).
51. See Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit, 50 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 135, 143-49 (1982).
52. Indeed, it has been suggested that psychiatrists' expertise is simply that of observa-
tion. See infra note 163.
53. "Mental disorder is thus diagnosed by observing the person's behavior. There are
no physical tests for the presence or absence of mental disorder. . . . Behavior is the only
data in mental health diagnosis that all diagnosticians would agree is relevant." Morse,
supra note 6 at 546 (footnotes omitted). See also AM. MEDICAL ASS'N, CURRENT MEDICAL
INFORMATION AND TERMINOLOGY 366-67 (B. Gordon 4th ed. 1971).
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is a very strange position in which to place expert decisionmakers.
Moreover, it is not even clear to what extent psychiatric deci-
sionmakers operating within the traditional adversary system
would be allowed to use their expertise in this very general way.
Such use might be viewed as going outside of the record in an
impermissible manner. In a somewhat analogous situation, an Or-
egon court has indicated that it would be improper for an expert
to do so. 54 This seems an unnecessarily restrictive standard which,
if applied, would leave virtually no role for the expertise of the
decisionmaker.
One way in which one might envision this hybrid psychiatric
decisionmaker (that is, one who operates in the adversary context
but is not passive) is to try to differentiate fact-finding from dispo-
sition. Under this view, the psychiatrist would use the adversary
process to determine the relevant "facts" and wouldthen apply
expert knowledge to these "facts" to arrive at a decision. 5 Usu-
ally, however, there are not many "facts" that can be used apart
from the examination of the patient. Normally, the psychiatrist
will use his or her own methods for deciding whether to accept
outside reports concerning a patient's prior behavior, and the ex-
amination and diagnosis of the patient are usually seen as impor-
tant in making these factual determinations." Thus, although a
process which splits fact-finding from the application of the expert
knowledge to these facts may have some theoretical appeal, it is
incompatible with normal psychiatric decisionmaking.
[Since] the opinion of the psychiatrist is derived from his own highly subjec-
tive, total impression of the patient, it is impossible for him to divide his
opinion into fragments. He cannot claim that a particular portion of his
opinion was derived from direct observations of the patient while another
portion comes from third parties. He cannot even confidently say that in the
absence of such and such information he might have reached a different
conclusion. If the psychiatrist is well trained and experienced, he will resist
54. Rolfe v. Psychiatric Sec. Rev. Bd., 53 Or. App. 941, 633 P.2d 846 (1981) (en
banc).
55. On the question of the factual element of expertise used in legal settings, see
Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLum. L. REv. 1080 (1966). For a considera-
tion of some use of the adversary process in scientific research in general, see Levine, Scien-
tific Method and the Adversary Model, 29 AM. PsycHoLoGs'T 661 (1974).
56. See generally THE COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOoK OF PSYCHIATRY-III 904 (H. Kaplan,
A. Freedman & B. Sadack eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as COMPREHENSIVE TExTBoOK OF
PSYCHIATRY]; H. SULLIVAN, THE PSYCHIATRIC INTERVIEW 66 (1954).
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with all his powers such attempts to particularize and fragment.5 7
Indeed, no decisionmaker is really able to divorce the fact-finding
process from the overall decisionmaking process."
Whereas the use of the totally passive psychiatric deci-
sionmaker within an adversary proceeding produces some ques-
tionable situations, there are also difficulties with the other uses of
psychiatric decisionmakers. The decisionmaker role created by
the Rennie district judge is somewhat a compromise between the
full use of the adversary process and its virtual abandonment. But
can decisionmakers operating in an adversary context conduct
their own investigation without undercutting the very purpose of
the adversary proceeding? Would the parties' presentations be
anything more than a sham? Are there any significant problems
inherent in the lack of passivity of the decisionmaker?
Similar questions occur at the Parham end of the spectrum.
What type of "due process of law" is being provided when there is
no hint of the adversary system or the type of decisionmaker tra-
ditionally associated with due process? Concerns naturally arise
about whether this psychiatric decisionmaker can ever be an ap-
propriate due process decisionmaker and what "outside" require-
ments need to be added to make such a decisionmaker minimally
adequate. The key question, however, is whether such concerns
are justified. Not all important decisions in our society are appro-
priate for nor made by an adjudicative hearing process.5 9 Does the
difference in mode of investigation and type and role of deci-
sionmaker matter for what ultimately is being sought in these
situations?
In order to try to address the issues raised above, it is neces-
sary first to explore, at least briefly, the broader purposes of the
due process requirement, particularly in the area of mental health
law. Also, it is necessary to examine the dynamics between these
purposes and the more specific rules for judicial decisionmakers.
Only then can one examine whether psychiatric decisionmakers,
particularly those using only their own profession's method of in-
57. Diamond & Louisell, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some Ruminations and
Speculations, 63 MicH. L. REv. 1335, 1350-51 (1965).
58. See Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Facfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1083, 1087 (1975).




vestigation, can meet these specific rules and whether they should
be subject to them.
II. THE NEUTRAL AND INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIC
DECISIONMAKER
A. Overview of Due Process
Before considering the goals traditionally seen as served by
due process requirements, an even more preliminary inquiry is ap-
propriate: What, at a minimum, does it mean to say that some
procedures are required by the fourteenth amendment because a
deprivation is occurring? Must these be procedures that would not
be mandated by other legal requirements? Specifically, does it
mean anything to say that due process requires only that the pro-
fessional who makes the initial decision do so in accordance with
that decisionmaker's own professional standards? 0 The person
who is subject to that professional's decision already has that
"right" and a remedy in a tort suit for the professional's negligent
or bad-faith decision. Presumably, when a fourteenth amendment
due process right is found to exist, something additional is re-
quired-something more than just the possibility of a federal
court forum for the post-deprivation suit.6 1 At the very least, the
fourteenth amendment requires that the decisionmaker and the
decisionmaking procedure used be subjected to some sort of legal
scrutiny that will ensure that certain minimal standards are met.
This might entail grafting certain aspects of the traditional due
process decisionmaking procedure onto the procedure used by the
profession which has the initial responsibility for the decision.
Thus, the issue becomes one of determining which aspects, if any,
need be imposed upon the psychiatric decisionmaker.
The appropriateness of applying specific criteria cannot be in-
telligently considered without some concept of the ultimate goal
60. Admittedly, Parham is an example of the psychiatric decisionmaker checking the
initial decision of another, the child's parent. But the principle can be carried to the point
of saying that there is a deprivation subject to due process protection, but the initial deci-
sion by the medical professional satisfies any due process requirement. Boarding Home
Advocacy Team, Inc. v. O'Bannon, 525 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D. Pa. 1981), in effect adopts this
view, although a fourteenth amendment deprivation is only assumed for purposes of
discussion.
61. See generally Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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sought to be achieved by requiring adequate due process. At its
most general level, the due process requirement prevents the gov-
ernment from taking certain actions without doing so in a manner
that aims to ensure two things: first, that serious consideration be
given to whether the action is correct-that is, whether the fac-
tual assumptions are accurate and the result that flows from these
facts is in accordance with the prescribed standards; second, that
the person subject to the action have some input into the decision-
making process so that his or her view of the matter has been
considered and some explanation for the action has been received.
Stated differently, the two main values due process seeks to en-
hance are accuracy and participation. 62 Accuracy has been de-
scribed as an "instrumental" value,63 while participation has been
termed an "intrinsic" or "dignitary"64 value.
These values are not always viewed as equal aspects of the
due process ideal; the Supreme Court, in particular, appears much
more concerned with ensuring only the instrumental values."e
Still, it is important that the intrinsic values be recognized, espe-
cially because some of the procedures discussed in this Article
eliminate the adversary system, which provides a means of ensur-
ing these values. Participation in the process helps to legitimate
the result reached, though some would claim that it merely subli-
mates conflict by redirecting affected persons' energies. 6 More
importantly, the intrinsic aspects of due process can be of great
psychological value to the affected person: they can assist in devel-
oping a concept of self and a feeling of contribution to important
decisions about one's own life.61 This is a particularly vital con-
cern where mental health issues are concerned, since such deci-
sions relate to fundamental aspects of the individuals' control over
their own lives.
62. Marshall v. Jerico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
63. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7 (1978).
64. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge. Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49-52
(1976).
65. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); L. TRIBE, at note 63, § 10-7;
Mashaw, supra note 64. But see Marshall v. Jerico, Inc., 446 U.S. 242.
66. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis.
L. REV. 29, 125-26 (1978).
67. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims In Procedural Due Process, 18 NoMos 126,
127-28 (1977).
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The various particular requirements developed under the ru-
bric of due process exist to protect either or, in most cases, both
of these values." In their most formal development, these re-
quirements can be broadly stated to be that the affected person be
given an opportunity to be heard before the final decision is
made; 9 that the hearing proceed in a special manner (tradition-
ally, in accordance with the adversary system); 0 and that a partic-
ular type of decisionmaker (neutral,1 independent72 and passive 3)
make the decision. 4
The opportunity to be heard obviously ensures participation,
but it also promotes accuracy.75 Usually the affected person has
68. This is not to suggest that other procedures could not be used and still satisfy
some abstract requirement of being "fair." "Uniquely in the United States, adversarial due
process and fundamental fairness have become virtually synonymous." Kirp, Proceduralism
and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. RaV. 841, 871 (1976). Indeed,
although the judicial adversary system is the traditional model for due process, there are
other deviations from it besides those involving the psychiatric decisionmaker. See id. at
871-72. Still, as the traditional model, it is appropriate to use the judicial adversary system
for comparison as is done below in section II(B). See infra notes 85-157 and accompanying
text.
69. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
70. At least there will usually be some of the fundamentals of what have been viewed
as the essential attributes of the adversary process: specifically, confrontation and cross-
examination. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 269-70. See Landsman, The Decline of the Adver-
sary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American
Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 487, 490 (1980). But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584
(1975).
71. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196 (1982) ("impartiality"); Marshall v. Jer-
ico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) ("neutrality"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271 ("im-
partial decisionmaker").
72. The nature and scope of this independence requirement, see infra notes 87-90 and
accompanying text, casts some doubt on the degree to which there is such a general due
process requirement. Nevertheless, it is fair to consider it a requirement in the due process
context as well as the general judicial context. See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409
U.S. 57 (1972), where the due process violation actually was caused by the decisionmaker's
lack of independence from an interested entity. The Supreme Court used the phrase "neu-
tral and detached judge." Id. at 62 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has also recog-
nized the possibility of a due process violation through "derivative bias." Schweiker v. Mc-
Clure, 456 U.S. at 197. See infra note 85.
73. Although the amount of passivity will certainly vary, even more than in the judi-
cial context, see infra note 126, a requirement of some degree of passivity is implicit in the
authorization of some type of adversary proceedings. See Landsman, supra note 70, at 490-
91.
74. Another requirement often mandated is that reasons be given for the decision.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271.
75. Tribe sees this requirement as "ultimately more understandable as inherent in de-
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information or a viewpoint on the action that should be consid-
ered in order to ensure accuracy. This is a part of the underlying
basis for the form of the hearing used in the adversary system."
With regard to mental health law, it is particularly important that
the affected party be seen and heard because a crucial considera-
tion in the decision involves that particular party: the party's views
and wishes and the "rationality" of those views and wishes. There
is also the substantial issue of determining which are the best
means to be used by the decisionmaker to learn about and evalu-
ate the character and desires of this person.
Mental health law also raises other special problems with re-
gard to the formal right to be heard. The person might be unable
to participate in a very meaningful way, or, as it is sometimes ar-
gued,' 7 the participation might be anti-therapeutic and thus actu-
ally contrary to the long-term interests of the person. Alterna-
tively, the person might not have a strong desire to participate in
the process. There are arguments for special considerations on
both sides regarding the right to be heard in mental health cases
that deserve recognition.78
Again, the adversarial determination and presentation of evi-
dence is a means of ensuring participation rights as well as ensur-
ing a more accurate result. Admittedly, the direct participation of
the party is often limited when there is representation by counsel.
Nevertheless, the adversary system's emphasis on the parties' con-
trol of the determination and presentation of the evidence and
arguments does enhance the participation value, though at times
perhaps at the expense of accuracy."9 Indeed, proponents of the
adversary system have advanced two arguments for the contention
that it is actually the best vehicle for ensuring accuracy. The first
argument is that the head-on clash of interested parties allows
each party to expose the weaknesses or falsity of the assertions
cent treatment than as optimally designed to, minimize mistakes." L. TRIBE, supra note 64,
§ 10-15, at 554.
76. See Landsman, supra note 70, at 490.
77. See, e.g., H. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 281-82 (1965); Weihofen, Hospitalizing
the Mentally Ill, 50 MIcI. L. REv. 837, 847-48 (1952).
78. For Parham, which concerned children, there was the additional special concern of
the importance that should be afforded to the intrinsic aspects of participation. See also
Garvey, supra note 3, at 842.
79. See, e.g., Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D.
83 (1976); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
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and evidence of the opposition.8" The second argument, which fo-
cuses on the decisionmaker's role and thus is closely connected
with some of the issues to be discussed below, is that the adver-
sarial method of presentation of evidence and argument helps to
guarantee that the decisionmaker maintains an open mind about
the matter in controversy throughout the process.81 The deci-
sionmaker constantly will be exposed to the evidence and argu-
ments that are contrary to any initial impression formed about the
exact nature of the problem or dispute and what should be done
about it.
The special attributes of the due process decisionmaker, in
addition to serving to protect the accuracy aim of the decision-
making process, also tend to help legitimate the process in the
eyes of the participant in much the same way as does participa-
tion. While independence and neutrality are rather generalized at-
tributes of any decisionmaker, passivity is more closely connected
with the adversary system.82 Yet, as noted above,8" there is some
claim that the adversary process also is specially connected with
independence and neutrality.
How essential are these various criteria to the broad goals of
due process when the decisionmaker is a psychiatrist? Does the
psychiatrist satisfy these criteria? Are there equivalent procedures
or protections that will in their own way achieve these broad
goals? A comparison between the use of the psychiatric deci-
sionmaker and the restrictions placed on the use of the most for-
80. E.g., "The interesting striving of two contending parties is, in the long run, an
infinitely better agency for the ascertainment of truth than any species of paternalistic in-
quiry." Millar, The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure I, 18 ILL L. REv. 1, 16 (1923);
"[t]he resultant decision should be very comprehensively and creatively fashioned because
of this adversarial input." Adams, The Small Claims Court and the Adversary Process-More
Problems of Function and Form, 51 CAN. B. REv. 583, 593 (1973).
81. "'An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combating this
natural tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully
known .... ' " Fuller, The Adversary System in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34, 44 (H. Berman
ed. 1971) (quoting an American Bar Ass'n Comm. report). See also Thibaut, Walker &
Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARV. L. REv. 386, 389-90
(1972); Lind, Thibaut & Walker, A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Effect of Adversary and
Inquisitorial Processes on Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 62 VA. L. REv. 271, 272-73 (1976). But
see Damaska, supra note 58. For a discussion and critique of this argument in the broader
context of justifications for the adversary system, see Simon, supra note 66, at 69-76.
82. See supra note 73.
83, See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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mal model developed for a due process decisionmaker 84-the ju-
dicial-type decisionmaker-will shed considerable light on these
questions.
B. Traditional Restrictions on Judicial-type Officers Applied
to Psychiatric Decisionmakers
1. Neutrality and independence. Although the concepts of "neu-
trality" and "independence" represent two quite different charac-
teristics of the ideal decisionmaker, the difference is not always
emphasized.8 5 At times it appears that they are used interchangea-
bly, simply to mean "fair." But they provide further meaning to
the "fairness" ideal and should be separately identified. Indepen-
dence, as applied to a decisionmaker, does not refer to the ab-
sence of any personal predisposition toward the decision as a re-
sult of a concern with the outcome or the parties. Rather,
independence in this context refers to insulation from influences
on the decisionmakers that are external to either their own per-
sonal predilections or the data and arguments upon which the de-
,cision is supposed to be based. The expressed ideal is to have deci-
sionmakers be independent from factors outside of the process
itself, such as the political system, the demands of the institution
of which they are a part, or the press. 8
As a general matter, the Supreme Court has not found that
due process requires that a decisionmaker have no connection
with the relevant institution or state bureaucracy.1 This is true in
the mental health context as well.88 Some district courts have im-
posed a requirement that the decisionmaker be independent from
84. See supra note 86.
85. The Supreme Court has used the term "derivative bias" in discussing the possible
due process significance of Medicare hearing officers' connections with private insurance
carriers, although no such bias was found. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. at 197. This
alleged inadequacy of the decisionmaker more properly should be viewed as a possible lack
of sufficient independence from an entity that might be interested in the outcome. See also
McCormack, The Purpose of Due Process: Fair Hearing or VehileforrJudidal Review?, 52 TEx.
L. REv. 1257, 1262-72 (1974) (discussion of "institutional bias").
86. For a recent discussion of the concept of independence in its most usual con-
text-judicial independence-see Kaufman, The Essence ofJudicial Independence, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 671 (1980).
87. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1974). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970).
88. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980).
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the institution"--that is, not a member of the hospital which
seeks to take the action opposed by the patient-or even that that
decisionmaker be independent from the entire mental health
department.90
In the context of mental health issues, is it necessary to re-
quire independence from the institution itself? A hospital is gener-
ally not the type of "interested party" which would try to influ-
ence the psychiatric decisionmaker in these cases. There is no
evidence to support the contention that, because the hospital is
holding the person or wishes to admit the person, only a psychia-
trist who is independent from the hospital should make the initial
decision of whether to admit or medicate the patient. This situa-
tion should be carefully distinguished from the one, to be dis-
cussed later, in which the initial decision already has been made
and now the hospital might have reason to support its earlier con-
clusion.91 If the "due process hearing" is simply the initial exami-
nation by the staff pschiatrist, independence from the institution
would need to be demanded only in certain circumstances.
Such independence should be required only if there is some
reason to believe that the institution itself would likely be inter-
ested in the outcome of the decision. If, for instance, there were
some basis for thinking that a hospital wished to increase its in-
patient population, then perhaps the decisionmaker determining a
question of admission of a patient should be independent of the
hospital. Today, such a situation would be exceptional.9 2 How-
ever, it is plausible to posit that a hospital and its employees might
have an interest in a different type of decision, such as whether
medication is to be administered. Safety and working conditions
might well be affected by such a decision. 3 Thus, the issue of the
independence of the decisionmaker from the institution should
89. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1310-12 (D.N.J. 1979), rev'd, 653 F.2d 836
(3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
90. Doe v. Gallinot, No. CV76-107-F, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 1982). But see
Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 1981).
91. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
92. The movement in recent years has been toward deinstitutionalization of public
mental hospitals and toward outpatient care rather than inpatient care. See generally G.
MACLEOD & M. PERLMAN, HEALTH CARE CAPrrAL CoMPETrmON AND CONTROL (1976).
93. See Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment,
72 Nw. U.L. REV. 461, 478 (1978).
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depend on the nature of the decision 4 as well as on its timing vis-
A-vis a previous decision.
The discussion of independence has focused on being inde-
pendent of others who are not totally neutral. Neutrality, of
course, is a basic requirement for the decisionmakers them-
selves. 95 Neutrality refers to the personal desires of deci-
sionmakers; decisionmakers are neutral when they personally have
no desire, deemed improper, to have the case decided one way or
another. The concept can be further broken down, as it is in the
judicial context, to include personal interest and bias.90 Judges are
"interested" in a matter if they are likely to personally gain or
lose some concrete thing depending on the outcome of the deci-
sion. 7 Judges are improperly "biased" if they have some specific
and unacceptable reason to favor or disfavor one of the parties to
the dispute even though the judge has nothing concrete to gain or
lose from the decision.98
As a general matter, psychiatrists might be found to be "in-
terested" decisionmakers if it can be shown that they have some
personal stake in the outcome of a decision. Usually, there is no
foundation for believing that psychiatrists would have a financial
interest in institutionalization decisions, although in other con-
texts it has been argued that doctors may be seen as having a fi-
nancial conflict of interest.99 But non-monetary interests are some-
times seen as inherent in certain psychiatric decisionmaking. As
previously mentioned, a psychiatrist who works with a patient
might have a personal interest in whether the patient is involunta-
rily medicated because of the possible effects on the psychiatrist's
94. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584 (1975) (due process requires, at a mini-
mum, "give-and-take" of notice to student of ground for suspension of up to 10 days and
opportunity for student to explain actions).
95. See supra note 71.
96. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(C)(1)(a) & (c) (1980). See generally Frank,
Disqualification ofJudges, 56 YALE LJ. 605 (1947); Note, Disqualification ofJudges and Justices
in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736 (1973).
97. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19:6 (2d ed. 1980). See Frank, supra
note 96, at 613-18.
98. K. DAVIS, supra note 97, § 19:5. See Frank, supra note 96, at 618-26. Bias is actu-
ally a term that can have a much broader meaning. See K. DAVIS, supra note 97, § 19:1. See
also infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
99. Bennett, Allocation of Child Medical Care Decisionmaking Authority. A Suggested Inter-
est Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 285, 319-20 (1976).
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own convenience and safety. 100 It might be argued that a psychia-
trist who makes any type of hospitalization decision concerning a
person who would then be a patient is interested, either because
of a desire to work on this "interesting case,"101 or, conversely,
out of a desire not to have the person as a patient.1 0 2 Neverthe-
less, the danger of interested decisionmaking in this context may
well be too speculative to justify excluding "treating psychiatrists"
from such decisionmaking.
Similarly, it is conceivable that a psychiatrist may be person-
ally biased or prejudiced against a particular patient, but there is
no reason to believe that most or even a significant percentage of
psychiatrists harbor the type of personal bias that requires disqual-
ification of a decisionmaker. Admittedly, there have been sugges-
tions that psychiatrists' clinical judgments are biased against mi-
norities and persons from lower social classes.10 But even if this
were true, the intensity of the bias would probably be about the
same as that harbored by judges as a whole10 4 and thus would pro-
vide no basis for excluding psychiatrists in particular from the
decisionmaking process. Indeed, psychiatrists may be the profes-
sionals who are most conscious of their biases and therefore most
able to compensate for them.10 5 While we might question any per-
son's ability to overcome his or her own biases, at least psychia-
trists are more likely to be aware of the need for the effort than
100. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Judges, too, can be seen as having a
type of interest in certain decisions that affect their professional working conditions which,
although not a basis for disqualification, at least should dictate better scrutiny of these
decisions by appellate courts. See Berger, The Mandamus Power of the United States Courts of
Appeals: A Complex and Confused Means of Appellate Control, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 37, 102-04
(1982).
101. See Bennett, supra note 99, at 320.
102. See Weihofen, Detruding The Experts, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 38, 53 (1973).
103. See Abramowitz & Dokecki, The Politics of Clinical Judgment: Early Empirical Re-
turns, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL 460 (1977); Adembimpe, Overview: White Norms and Psychiat-
ric Diagnosis of Black Patients, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1981).
104. There are some studies on sentencing that might suggest this. See Nagle, Dispari-
ties in Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA L. REv. 1272 (1967); Tullock, Does Punishment Deter
Crime, 36 PUB. INT. 103 (1974).
105. See A. FREEDMAN & M. KAPLAN, DIAGNOSING MENTAL ILLNESS 5-6 (1972); P. Mit-
tier, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF MENTAL & PHYSICAL HANDICAPS 6-7 (1970).
Actually it is more likely that psychiatrists are more aware of their emotional responses
to patients that could constitute biases, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra
note 56, at 898, than they are conscious of actual class biases. See D. LIGHT, BECOMING




Indeed, bias is a far-reaching concept. A judge might wish to
favor or disfavor a party because of an attitude toward the person
which has no relationship to his particular status in the dispute.
This is a "personal" bias and is normally one for which a judge is
disqualifiable. 0 6 But we also speak of "bias" of judicial deci-
sionmakers toward parties solely as a result of their position in the
litigation-for example, being, in general, favorably disposed to-
ward criminal defendants or defendants in product liability cases.
Usually this stems from the judge's underlying political or juris-
prudential 'outlook on life; it is actually a prejudgment about a
question of law or policy. This latter type of predisposed favorit-
ism is normally not deemed "bias" for purposes of
disqualification.0
It is, of course, not always easy to differentiate disqualifiable
personal bias from strong views on policy or legal questions.108
This is particularly true when a judge is biased against a class of
individuals, 09 such as selective-service offenders. In an extreme
case, one court has found this to be a disqualifiable bias.110 Psychi-
atrists, it has been claimed, have a tendency to overdiagnose
mental illness-that is, to err on the side of finding that a person
has such an illness.""" One might argue, therefore, that they are
improperly and personally biased against a class of people-those
that are on the margin of being found to have a serious mental
illness-if such a class could be identified. Yet this is really an in-
dictment of the way in which they apply quite broad and amor-
106. Canon 3(C)(1)(a) of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUar uses the phrase "personal bias
or prejudice concerning a party." See United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d
Cir. 1973); K. DAVIS, supra note 97, § 19:5; Frank, supra note 96, at 618-26; Note, supra
note 96, at 751-57.
107. See, e.g., Deal v. Warner, 369 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1973). See generally Memo-
randum of Justice Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 830-36 (1973); In reJ. P.
Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 651-52 (2d Cir. 1943); K DAVIs, supra note 97, § 19:2.
108. In the administrative context there is somewhat more willingness to find disquali-
fication because of the decisionmaker's views about the parties resulting only from their
position in the dispute. See K. DAVIS, supra note 97, § 19:5.
109. The classic case of a finding of disqualifiable bias against a class is Berger v.
United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (bias against Germans).
110. United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1973).
111. "Mental health experts are a bit more inclined than the average person to de-
clare that particular behaviors are abnormal and evidence mental disorder." Morse, supra
note 6, at 556.
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phous "standards." In other words, while psychiatrists might be
more ready to find mental illness than they should be, this is more
a general bias inherent in their expertise than a personal bias
against a preexisting definable class.
It is true, though, that psychiatrists as decisionmakers possess
a great deal of the general type of bias that normally is not a basis
for disqualification. As a group they certainly have strong views
on the matters that they would be deciding. These views are a
function of their expertise. This same expertise that is the basis of
using them as decisionmakers can also be viewed as a collection of
biases. For all expertise is simply a collection of one or more "bi-
ases," if by this we mean viewpoints or outlooks on how the world
and the people and things within it work." 2 Moreover, this is the
type of "bias" that is the most difficult for anyone to recognize
and overcome. One's professional training does not help to elimi-
nate these "biases"; rather, it creates them.11 Still, as indicated,
these are not the types of biases that traditionally have been
viewed as affecting neutrality of the decisionmaker sufficiently to
require disqualification. As attempted below," 4 consideration
must be given to whether these "biases" are a relevant factor in
deciding who should be used as the actual due process deci-
sionmaker and how expertise should be employed in the decision-
making process.
There is, however, another standard due process requirement
that seeks to ensure neutrality. This is the requirement that the
due process decisionmaker have no substantial involvement in ar-
riving at the original decision." 5 Although easily confused with
the notion of being "independent" of the original decision,"16 this
requirement actually is designed to prevent using an "interested"
decisionmaker. Such a decisionmaker is "interested" in the out-
112. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
113. See Light, supra note 106, at 236-37, 252-57.
114. See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
115. "In our view, due process requires that after the arrest, the determination that
reasonable ground exists for revocation of parole should be made by someone not directly
involved in the case." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972); See also Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). But see generally Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
116. In Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court refers to the requirement in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970), that the due process decisionmaker should not "have
participated in making the determination under review" as the "need for an independent
decisionmaker .... " 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)
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come because, already having made a decision in the matter, he or
she has a personal stake in being proven right. Note that this is
not the normal personal interest that exists prior to any formal
presentation of the issue. Instead, it is a type of "professional"
interest that arises solely because of involvement in the overall
decisionmaking process regarding this matter. Once an individual
has rendered a decision, it is doubtful that he or she could fairly
be entrusted with further decisionmaking responsibility, even if
different procedures would develop more and, hopefully, better
information. Most people cannot truly keep an open mind about a
specific question upon which they have previously announced a
position because they become "psychologically wedded" to their
initial position.1 7 This might be even more pronounced for medi-
cal decisionmakers, who in general are quite sensitive to their rep-
utations for professional competence.11 8
The manner in which this particular requirement should be
applied to the psychiatric decisionmaker depends upon the cir-
cumstances in which the psychiatrist is used. In a situation like
Parham, where the "hearing" is simply the initial examination by
the staff psychiatrist, it is unlikely that the question will arise. The
"formal hearing" and the initial decision by the institution will
usually be one and the same. However, in situations in which the
examining psychiatrist is the doctor who had originally suggested
to the parents that the child should be hospitalized, it is questiona-
ble whether the physician can make a disinterested examination.
Even if the suggestion were only a preliminary one based on a
partial examination, the psychiatrist naturally would be somewhat
"psychologically wedded" to his initial diagnosis. This type of pre-
disposition, however, does not automatically constitute a basis for
disqualification under the normal standards applied to adjudica-
tors. The appropriate analogy might be that of the judge who has
ruled on a preliminary injunction and is now conducting a full
hearing for the final resolution of the case" 9 or the administrative
decisionmaker who had previously indicated there was probable
117. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. at 57; National Rifle Ass'n v. U.S. Postal Service,
407 F. Supp. 88, 93-94 (D.D.C. 1976).
118. Lowcher v. New York City Teachers Retirement Sys., 54 N.Y.2d 373, 378, 429
N.E.2d 1167, 1170, 445 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1981).
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
706 [Vol. 33
PSYCHIATRIST AS DECISIONMAKER
cause for a complete investigation. 2
A psychiatrist's complete medical examination of a patient
before advising the patient's parents could qualify as the required
due process hearing, assuming the psychiatrist is sufficiently inde-
pendent of the parents. The psychiatrist could not bring a com-
pletely open mind to the issue at the time of the hospitalization,
but that is not crucial. If due process required some type of appel-
late review (or, in the language of the medical profession, a sec-
ond opinion), then there would be reason to have a new psychia-
trist make the decision. But as a general matter, there is no
constitutional right to appellate review, 21 and Parham does not
appear to envision such a requirement in the particular context of
institutionalization. Indeed, the psychiatric decisionmaker who
previously had performed a complete medical examination is com-
parable to a judge who is considering a motion to reconsider his
or her decision.
The question takes on added dimensions for the type of psy-
chiatric decisionmaker envisioned by the district court in Rennie.
Ignoring the serious issue of independence previously discussed, 
22
should the psychiatrist who initially decided that the patient be
given medication even over the patient's objections be qualified to
be the decisionmaker when the "informal hearing" is held? The
answer is dependent upon the nature of the hearing and the role
of the psychiatric decisionmaker at that stage. Would the psychiat-
ric decisionmaker at the "informal hearing" stage still conduct his
or her own psychiatric examination of the patient? How much
would the psychiatrist be restricted to relying only upon the "evi-
dence" presented at the informal hearing?
The significance of these questions becomes clearer when one
examines what seems to be a major part of the rationale for
prohibiting any prior substantial involvement of the deci-
sionmaker in the ordinary due process case. A decision is first
made by an official operating on the basis of his or her own deci-
sionmaking procedures. A traditional due process hearing is then
necessary. The method by which the original decision was made is
seen as procedurally inferior and inadequate to the due process
120. See Withrow v. Larkin, 412 U.S. 35 (1975); K. DAvis, supra note 97, § 19:4.
121. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18
(1956). Contra Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 n.11 (1973).
122. See supra notes 93, 100 and accompanying text.
1984] 707
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
hearing. Yet, the initial decisionmaker is already committed to a
decision reached by using these inadequate and inferior proce-
dures.12 3 Thus, the psychiatric decisionmaker authorized in Doe,
who would operate in an adversary context, could not be one who
had previously made the initial diagnosis and decision to commit.
It might be a far different situation for the psychiatric deci-
sionmaker at the informal hearing envisioned in Rennie if all the
information gained from the original examination would be a
proper aspect of this "informal hearing." The crucial question
would be what else could be presented at this hearing. Would
there be so much additional evidence and argument presented
that the process should be seen as a whole new decisionmaking
procedure, or would the judicial reconsideration analogy also be
applicable here?
2. Neutrality and passivity. Another fundamental attribute of
an adjudicator in an adversary system is passivity.2 In the adver-
sary model, the judge is not only neutral and independent, but is a
passive arbiter as well: he or she does not take an active role in
developing the information upon which the decision will be made.
Instead, the opposing parties shoulder this responsibility and the
judge decides solely on the basis of the information and argu-
ments presented. Of course, strict adherence to this model varies
greatly in practice 2  and there is considerable debate over the ex-
tent to which it should be the ideal toward which to strive. 126 Nev-
ertheless, it is the general framework in which judges in this coun-
try act and is the model from which due process requirements are
drawn.
As noted earlier, passivity is often seen as an adjunct to the
other due process "rights," including those which allow parties an
123. There is significance to the fact that an actual previous decision has been made
to which the decisionmaker is now committed. See supra note 118; K. DAVIS, supra note 97,
§ 19:4.
124. See Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 380-86 (1982); Landsman,
supra note 70, at 491 & n.11.
125. Judges, particularly federal judges, often have wide authority in such matters as
commenting on evidence and questioning witnesss. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115,
1129-31 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983). There is also concern about
the way in which federal judges have been abandoning passivity as they take on more re-
sponsibility for managing the pre-trial phases of cases. See Resnick, supra note 70.
126. See Frankel, supra note 79; Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility,
65 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1952).
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opportunity to be heard and present their case. Thus, one pur-
pose of having the judge remain passive is to enhance the feelings
of participation and control over one's own fate that have been
identified as values being served by due process requirements.
17
To what extent does the psychiatric decisionmaking process
provide an equivalent means of ensuring participation and con-
trol? Although psychiatrists undoubtedly would find the inquiry
strange, one can determine whether they afford their patients an
equivalent of the right to be heard. The relationship between a
psychiatrist and patient obviously is quite different than that be-
tween a judge and a party. In one sense, almost all that a psychia-
trist does is "hear" the patient. But this is really just an observa-
tion of the patient's general thoughts and behavior rather than a
"hearing" in which the patient's own view of relevant matters is
presented. Certainly, good psychiatric practice is generally seen as
taking the views and wishes of the patient into consideration.128
One of the things that the psychiatrist must determine is whether
these are the "true" wishes of the patients and whether the pa-
tients really understand what they claim to want. There is some
reason to think psychiatrists are often skeptical of their patients'
competence to participate in the process.129 These same problems
also can arise in a judicial setting; they are simply a part of the
special aspects of the participation rights in mental, health cases.
Standard texts advise psychiatrists to consider their patients'
desires and openly answer their patients' questions.1 30 One signifi-
cant current theory of the ideal therapy relationship stresses col-
laboration by "eliciting patient participation in their treatment
and increasing their sense of being in charge of themselves
127. See Landsman, supra note 70, at 492.
128. See Hoyt, Therapist and Patient Actions in Good Psychotherapy Sessions, 37 ARCH.
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 159 (1980); Orlinsky & Howard, The Good Therapy Hour: Experiential Cor-
relates of Patients' and Therapists' Evaluation of Therapy Sessions, 16 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY
621 (1967). One must be wary, however, of any attempt to generalize about psychiatric
practice given the vastly different "schools" of psychiatry that exist. See generally A. HOL-
LINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS, 155-61 (1958).
129. There is some evidence of this attitude in regard to consent to treatment, espe-
cially by hospitalized patients. See Kaufmann & Roth, Psychiatric Evaluation of Patient Deci-
sion-making: Informed Consent to ECT, 16 Soc. PSYCHIATRY 11 (1981); Stone, Informed Con-
sent: Special Problems for Psychiatry, 30 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 321 (1979).
130. THE HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 8 (A. Nicoli ed. 1978); CoMPREHEN-
SIVE TExTBooK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 56, at 902.
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... it11 Of course, the realities of the quality and number of
psychiatrists at state mental hospitals casts serious doubt on the
degree to which the psychiatrists who would generally be used as
due process decisionmakers would or could fit this ideal.13 2
Nevertheless, whereas some degree of participation probably
occurs in most situations, it is likely that very little actual control
of the process by the patient exists. The relationship is often built
upon the patient having confidence in the psychiatrist, who actu-
ally directs matters, hopefully leading to solutions to the
problems. 138 The participation/legitimation value of the party-
controlled adversary proceeding is not necessarily something that
psychiatrists are trying to foster. For many, their legitimation may
come from more of a notion of desire for and acceptance of con-
trols by the psychiatrist.134
This difference in approach, whatever its exact dimensions, is
not one that automatically should disqualify psychiatric decision-
making. In the first place, as mentioned earlier,135 the intrinsic
aspects of due process recently have been downplayed somewhat
by the Court. Moreover, it is very questionable whether parties
themselves, as opposed to their counsel, achieve much control
over the actual determination of the matter in an adversary hear-
ing. Finally, though the adversary system uses process as a means
of legitimation, it does not follow that a completely different
mode of decisionmaking, which seeks its legitimation by other
means, should not be recognized.
Concern about the complete abandonment of passivity re-
131. COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 56, at 2366. In the hospital
setting, this is supposed to be the relationship between staff and patient. Of course, there
are actually various different models of the doctor-patient relationship. See Szasz & Hollen-
der, The Basic Models of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 97 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 585 (1956).
132. See Koz, Catch-22: The Psychiatrist in the State Hospital, 9 PSYCHIATRY ANN. 47
(1979); Gralnick, Schact & Kempster, The Psychiatric Hospital as a Therapeutic Instrument, 8
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 312 (Apr. 1954), reprinted in THE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL AS A THER-
APEUTIC INSTRUMENT 3 (A. Gralnick ed. 1969); THE PATIENT AND THE MENTAL HOSPITAL 44
(M. Greenblatt, P. Levinson & R. Williams eds. 1957).
133. Thus, the psychiatrist decides when to acquiesce to a patient's request. See COM-
PREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 56, at 898.
134. See D. LIGHT, supra note 105, at 224-26. For a strong statement of the necessity
for control, see L. LINN, A HANDBOOK OF HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRY 11 (1955): "Patients who
are sick enough to require admission to a mental hospital are without exception regressed
to an emotional state of helpless infantile dependency."
135. See supra note 65.
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mains. Does passivity exist only to fulfill these participation values
of the adversary-process model, or is it also an essential adjunct to
neutrality and thus accuracy in a more generalized context? In
considering this, it is important to differentiate between passivity
as an assurance of actual neutrality and passivity as the mainte-
nance of the appearance of neutrality. In the adversary context, a
judge's active involvement in developing evidence will almost
never result in approximately equal amounts of favorable and un-
favorable evidence for both sides. Thus, the judge may be per-
ceived by a jury or one of the parties as being biased, as "helping"
one side, even though the judge is supposed to be neutral and
passive.""6 Notice, however, that this appearance of unfairness re-
sults to a great extent only because the judge's active participation
is contrary to the adversary-system model's assumption that all
parties should sink or swim on their own. Although such partici-
pation may sometimes lead to an appearance of impropriety in
other systems, the likelihood of its doing so is minimized once it is
recognized that the decisionmaker's involvement helps elicit the
necessary information to ensure the most accurate decision
possible.
The relationship between neutrality and passivity is best ex-
plored through discussion of a specific limitation on judicial deci-
sionmakers: judges are not allowed to hear any case about which
they have personal knowledge of disputed facts relevant to the
matter at issue.1 3 7 If a particular judge saw an automobile acci-
dent, for example, that judge could not sit on a case arising from
that accident. Why should that be so? Arguably, decisionmakers
who have personal knowledge of disputed facts might reach a
more accurate decision than those who do not, provided both
hear the evidence and testimony of others. Still, there are legiti-
mate reasons to be wary of decisionmakers with their own "knowl-
edge." Such decisionmakers can be considered neither passive nor
neutral. They would lack passivity because they would base their
136. See Landsman, supra note 70, at 491; People v. Mees, 47 N.Y.2d 997, 394 N.E.2d
283, 420 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1979) (reversal of conviction because judge's unusually active par-
ticipation in questioning witnesses created unfair trial).
137. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDuCr, Canon 3(C)(1)(a) (1980). See In re Murchison, 349
U.S. 133 (1955). In the administrative law area, the rule is different and some combination
of investigatory and adjudicatory authority is allowed. See K. DAvIs, supra note 97, § 19:4.
This is still quite different, however, from the full use of the psychiatric decisionmaker. See
infra text accompanying note 154.
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decisions partly upon information that they gathered themselves
rather than heard through the presentation of the parties. To
state it in a more formalistic way, such information might be con-
sidered matter outside the record. Similarly, they would lack neu-
trality because they presumably would have some preconceived
view of what happened based on their own observations outside
the adversary context, and these observations might well be incor-
rect.138 As has been noted," 9 it would be very difficult for judges
to be able to determine impartially the veracity of their own
knowledge.
The question is, then, whether this type of neutrality problem
always arises when the passivity requirement is abandoned. 140 For
instance, the psychiatric decisionmakers envisioned in Parham who
would rely upon their own examination would certainly not be
passive decisionmakers. They would be actively making their own
"investigation" (examination) and developing their information
based on their own observations. But whether or not they should
be viewed as lacking neutrality because they would have their own
knowledge of disputed facts is another matter.
Three aspects to this question should be recognized and con-
sidered separately. The first does not even concern neutrality di-
rectly, but naturally arises in the consideration of it: the conten-
tion that the psychiatrist, needing to determine whether certain
things actually occurred in the past, will make these determina-
tions in a manner less accurate than that which would result from
a full judicial proceeding. 4 1 Such a contention posits that the lack
of passivity directly causes inaccuracy (rather than doing so indi-
rectly) by creating a situation in which the decisionmaker would
not be neutral. The argument is based on a faith in the accuracy
of the adversary system's method of determining facts rather than
a belief in the inherent superiority of the decisionmaker.
The weaknesses of this contention are manifold. In the first
place, some situations exist, such as that in Parham, in which it is
138. There is psychological literature concerning the general problem of preconcep-
tions. See RL NisB=TT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCF STATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 66-71 (1980).
139. In re Continental Vending Machine Corp., 543 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1976).
140. For the view that this restriction on judges is a function of the adversary system,
see Damaska, supra note 58, at 1105.




not merely impractical and expensive to decide factual issues in an
adversary setting, but arguably harmful to the ultimate objective
of the proceeding.142 Thus, some alternative form of fact-finding
may have to be employed. Whereas the breadth of the claims of
injury resulting from the use of the adversary system in mental
health cases may be overstated, 143 there are definite problems
with its use and perhaps some instances in which it should not be
employed. Moreover, there is reason to question whether the le-
gal system's adversary method of resolving evidentiary disputes
definitely ensures greater accuracy than the methods relied upon
by other professions. The claims of the superiority of adversary
hearings have been called "assertions, which constitute a kind of
'folk-wisdom.' ",144 In fact, modern evidentiary rules recognize this
doubt, to some extent, by allowing experts to testify upon the ba-
sis of information relied upon in their profession even if it is inad-
missible under the prevailing evidentiary rules.1 45 Admittedly,
other professionals may make important decisions on the basis of
evidence of questionable reliability, but judges, too, often do the
same. Furthermore, an argument can be made that psychiatrists
are better than non-experts in resolving credibility disputes in
mental health cases because they are able to determine if outside
reports are consistent with their own evaluation of the patient.1 46
The second important aspect of the relationship between a
psychiatric decisionmaker's lack of passivity and neutrality stems
from a claim on behalf of the adversary system briefly mentioned
earlier.247 This is the contention that the tendency to rely upon
premature conclusions is lessened, and hence the continued neu-
trality of a decisionmaker is better ensured, when a passive deci-
sionmaker is forced to be constantly exposed to the opposing evi-
dence and arguments presented by the adverse party. Presumably
psychiatrists reach tentative conclusions as their own examination
and investigation proceeds. Can they keep an open mind on the
142. For examples of this problem in other contexts, see Boyer, supra note 43, at 121.
143. See Wexler & Scovile, The Administration of PsychiatricJustice: Theory and Practice in
Arizona, 13 ARiz. L. REv. 1, 69-72 (1971).
144. Kirp, supra note 68, at 873.
145. See, e.g., FED. 1K EViD. 703. But see Note, Hearsay Bases of Psychiatric Opinion Testi-
mony: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 51 S. CAT_ L. REv. 129 (1977).
146. But it is also claimed that, as a general matter, psychiatrists have no special ex-
pertise in making credibility determinations. Morse, supra note 6, at 614-15.
147. See supra note 81.
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question until the investigations are completed? The seriousness
of this issue is illustrated by the famous Rosenhan study,1 48 which,
among other things, seemed to indicate that once a person has
been labeled as mentally ill, mental health professionals are prone
to interpret all actions of the person in a manner consistent with
that initial diagnosis. It is logical to assume that a tendency for
this same type of error is likely to exist at even earlier stages of
the yet to be completed diagnostic process. Indeed, one observer
of psychiatric residents claims that they are, in effect, taught "to
get the patient to produce some material which could be used to
support one's prior interpretation. '4 Perhaps passive deci-
sionmakers acting in an adversary setting are less susceptible to
this problem; the empirical evidence said to support this proposi-
tion is, however, quite questionable. 50 I believe common sense
gives some weight to this claim but that may simply be a function
of my own legal training. Psychiatric decisionmakers act in their
role as trained professional decisionmakers, and any preliminary
observations they make occur only in the context of the official
decisionmaking process. Unlike judges, admittedly, their training
may encourage rather than discourage the early formulation of
hypotheses or conclusions. 51 Nevertheless, psychiatrists always
have to deal with this problem and are well aware of it.15 2 More-
over, as a general rule, judges cannot be disqualified for bias as a
result of any facts or information learned while formally presiding
over a case even though they may develop some degree of partial-
ity that ideally should not exist. 58 Similarly, psychiatric deci-
148. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 Sc. 250, 252-54 (1973). The study
has received much criticism, at least partly on the basis that the study merely showed exam-
ples of poor psychiatric practice. Wideman, Psychiatric Disease: Fiction or Reality?, 37 BULL
MENNINGER CLimc 519 (1973); Schectman, On Being Misinformed By Misleading Arguments,
37 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIc 523 (1973). For a general criticism, see Spitzer, On Pseudosci-
ence in Science, Logic in Remission and Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Critique of Rosenhan's "On Being
Sane in Insane Places," 84 J. ABNORMAL PSYcHIATRY 442 (1975), and the reply in Rosenhan,
The Contextual Nature of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 84 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHIATRY 462 (1975).
149. D. LIGHT, supra note 106, at 224-26.
150. See Damaska, supra note 58, at 1095-1103, criticizing the main empirical study of
Thibaut, Walker & Lind, supra note 81.
151. See D. LIGHT, supra, note 105, at 224-26.
152. Psychiatric texts do warn against failing to reconsider initial'diagnoses. See, e.g. H.
SULLIVAN, THE PsYcmAnTlc INTERviEw 74, 121 (1958).
153. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 583 (1966); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396
F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1968). But see Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181, 185 (8th
Cir. 1976) (recusal appropriate where district judge demonstrated great bias through overt
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sionmakers probably cannot be viewed as lacking minimal require-
ments of neutrality even though another system might provide
slightly better assurance of neutrality.
The third aspect of the psychiatric decisionmaker's active role
that might be seen as causing a neutrality concern is that psychia-
trists in their own practice base their decisions on their own exam-
inations. Unlike cases in the administrative law context that have
allowed adjudicators to be used who had been involved in the in-
vestigatory process,'" psychiatric decisionmakers authorized by
Parham, and perhaps Rennie, would not simply have heard the tes-
timony of potential witnesses in an ex parte setting, but actually
would have done their own examinations from which they would
have drawn their own conclusions. Arguably, they would have the
same problem evaluating the veracity of their own conclusions
that the judge has in evaluating his or her own observations of the
automobile accident.
Perhaps in some respects this criticism is true. Nevertheless,
psychiatrists' neutrality should not be viewed as inherently
tainted. The judge who saw the accident has no special abilities or
training in viewing and remembering such occurrences. 155 The
personal knowledge came from outside the judge's role as a
trained decisionmaker and outside the context of the sanctioned
decisionmaking process.1 5 In contrast to this, psychiatrists' obser-
vations and conclusions will be made within the context of their
professional decisionmaking ability and responsibility. A decision
may not be an accurate one, but that would be a result of the
inadequacy of the substantive capabilities of the decisionmaker
rather than the result of lack of heutrality of the decisionmaker.
It is undoubtedly true that psychiatric decisionmakers are
likely to rely on their own observations rather than on the opin-
ions of others. This would occur even in a hybrid situation like
that of the Rennie district court where psychiatrists would have to
listen to the adversary presentations of the parties in addition to
doing their own examination. This does not mean, however, that
psychiatrists cannot be seen as neutral decisionmakers. That psy-
acts and where he assumed role of advocate).
154. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See K. DAvis, supra note 97, § 19:4.
155. See Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 1970).
156. Admittedly, at one time jurors made their decision based on their own personal
knowledge. See W. FoRSYfH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JuRY (1852).
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chiatrists rely on their own observations is not a matter of neutral-
ity but rather of the substantive manner in which the decision is
to be made. They do not rely on the expert opinions of others
because, unlike most judges, they possess their own expertise on
the "scientific" aspects of the question and that is what they would
use as the fundamental basis for making decisions. The ultimate
question of what the decision should be is to be made solely by the
decisionmaker. A judge permits no expert opinions on the essen-
tial question of how a case should be decided; that is the judge's
function, for which he or she is trained. Similarly, the expert who
makes a decision based on his own expertise need not necessarily
entertain opinions from other experts. Such a model does not fit
our conception of the passive arbiter in the adversarial decision-
making process, but that does not prove that the particular deci-
sionmaker cannot be neutral. It is simply an entirely different use
of expertise in the decisionmaking process.
In summary, one finds that problems exist with the use of psy-
chiatric decisionmakers, especially ones who would not remain
passive. Still, the severity of these problems viewed solely in the
context of judicially recognized concerns about due process is not
so great that psychiatric decisionmakers as a class could not meet
traditional minimal levels of independence and neutrality. These
matters must be evaluated in particular cases, as with any deci-
sionmaker; but there is no inherent reason to believe that the psy-
chiatric decisionmaker (or pyschiatric decisionmaking process)
lacks the normal minimal characteristics, or sufficient equivalents,
of the basic requirements of due process as they are currently
viewed by courts. Nevertheless, there are other relevant consider-
ations that need to be explored in order to properly evaluate the
importance of choosing a particular type of decisionmaker in any
given instances.
III. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF EXPERTISE IN THE
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
A. The Nature of Psychiatric Expertise
Even if, as argued above, the use of a psychiatric deci-
sionmaker presents no inherent problems of independence or
neutrality, as those terms are used in the due process context, this
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should not end the inquiry. The. question remains whether the
psychiatrist's expertise should be used in this fashion in the deci-
sionmaking process.
Implicit in this question is the assumption that the psychiatric
profession has some expertise that can be used in the decision-
making process. Confusion can result from the failure to differen-
tiate between doubts about the expertise of a particular profession
and doubts about using a member of that profession as an expert
decisionmaker. Thus, the criticism, probably valid, that psychia-
trists have a poor accuracy rate in diagnosing mental illness and
predicting the utility of hospitalization 157 does not go directly to
the issue of whether a psychiatrist can be a proper decisionmaker.
Rather, it is relevant to the broader question of whether the type
of issue that the psychiatrist is to decide is one that any deci-
sionmaker is likely to decide with a high degree of accuracy.
Viewed from another perspective, however, this argument
concerning the accuracy of psychiatric diagnosis challenges the
presumption that psychiatrists possess any expertise at all on those
matters that should enter the decisionmaking process. This is the
contention presented by Stephen Morse.1 58 His thesis is that psy-
chiatrists are not experts on the legal questions of when one
should be deemed "crazy," because these are social and moral
questions rather than scientific ones. 159 This thesis is one which
has much to offer.
Nevertheless, we cannot easily dismiss psychiatric expertise
from the decisionmaking process. Even Morse does not do so. He
argues, in effect, that psychiatrists should not play a role in the
actual decisionmaking, but can aid in the fact-finding process.160
They can do this by reporting to the triers of fact such informa-
tion that may not be known to them. They can tell the judge or
jury relevant things they observed the person had said or done
157. See Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in
the Courtroom, 62 CALiF. L. REv. 693, 697-719 (1974).
158. Morse, supra note 6. Morse's basic contention is challenged in Bonnie &
Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed
Speculation, 66 VA. L. REv. 427, 452-96 (1980). Morse's reply is Morse, Failed Explanations
and Criminal Responsibility: Experts and the Unconscious, 68 VA. L. REv. 971 (1982).
159. Morse, supra note 6, at 560. See also J. ZISKIN, COPING WTH PsYcIrTIC AND
PSYCHOLOIcAL TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1975); Ennis & Litwack, supra note 157.
160. Morse, supra note 6, at 601-15.
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that the lay trier would not have noticed.161 Morse, however,
wishes to prevent psychiatrists from drawing their own conclu-
sions from this information. Morse recognizes that psychiatrists
have some special expertise in observing people and gathering rel-
evant data, 62 yet he finds no corresponding psychiatric expertise
in reaching conclusions from this data.
As mentioned earlier, 163 however, these two functions are not
easily split. Should the psychiatrists simply report on certain com-
ments or behavior from their examinations when they view the
matters as a whole? If psychiatrists have some expertise in con-
ducting examinations of allegedly mentally ill persons, why should
they be relegated to trying only to pass on the raw information?
16 4
Why can they not go the next step and offer their own conclu-
sions, or in the present setting, actually be the decisionmakers?
Morse's only answer to the questions he was considering ap-
pears to be that these decisions must be made by "society's repre-
sentatives. 1 65 Why can psychiatrists not play this role?'One possi-
ble reason is that, unlike judges, psychiatrists are not specifically
chosen to be decisionmakers for the public. This merely begs the
question, however. The more sophisticated version of this argu-
ment is that judges are chosen by some type of political process,
be it direct election or appointment by elected officials. Although
this is true, one goal of making judges independent is to insulate
them from politics, much as psychiatrists are so insulated. More-
over, not all due process decisionmakers are a direct product of
the political system. 66 If political selection were really thought to
be the crucial protection, psychiatrists conceivably could be
elected to decisionmaking positions in the legal system.1617 Thus,
the question of whether psychiatrists could be used as "society's
representatives" requires further exploration. 8
161. Id. at 611-12.
162. Id. at 612.
163. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
164. See generally Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 158, at 468-69.
165. Morse, supra note 6, at 560.
166. For instance, many hearing officers such as federal administrative law judges are
chosen in a non-partisan manner. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982).
167. This suggestion may seem somewhat absurd perhaps, but consider that coroners
are still elected in some places. See Sheehan, Phenneey, Bass & Green Professional Ass'n,
Death Investigation: An Analysis of Laws and Policies of U.S., Each State and Jurisdiction (as of
Jan. 31, 1977), HEW No. 240-76-0021 (1978).
168. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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At this tinie it is sufficient to note that if we choose to try to
make decisions regarding who should be hospitalized or given
medication against his or her will, we must recognize that the
group with the most expertise on matters relating to these ques-
tions is psychiatrists.16 9 Thus, that psychiatrists are going to play
some role in the decisionmaking process is inevitable. Still open is
the question of what this role should be, or more particularly,
who should actually be the formal decisionmaker. Though this
question was explored above in the specific and somewhat narrow
context of due process requirements, traditional considerations of
independence and neutrality are not the only relevant considera-
tions when comparing the psychiatric decisionmaker and the judi-
cial decisionmaker. While these may constitute essential qualifica-
tions for a decisionmaker, there may be a need to provide
additional controls if there is to be an effective check on the spe-
cialized biases of the profession as a whole.
B. Necessity for an External Control on Psychiatric Decisionmakers
The need for an external control on the psychiatric expert
can be so crucial that it affects the determination of who should
be the ultimate decisionmaker. Such control is necessary in many
instances because some check upon the psychiatric profession it-
self is needed. The accepted principles of "neutrality" discussed
above, which generally allow the use of a particular decisionmaker
regardless of that person's "political" or "philosophical" views,
should not necessarily apply where the question concerns using a
member of a given profession. As was suggested above, the exper-
tise of the members of the psychiatric profession regarding the
issues involved in the decisions they are to make renders them too
biased to make some decisions without an external control.17 0 A
169. This does not mean that every psychiatrist should be allowed to testify, nor that
other mental health professionals might not have sufficient expertise to qualify as expert
witnesses. See Bonnie & Slobogin, supra note 158, at 455-61.
170. One may ask whether judges do not also constitute an entire profession with a
particularlized knowledge over which there is a need for an external check. As a general
matter, there is no such external control on judges. Appellate review exists, but this is not
an external control for the profession itself. Admittedly, there is the significant recent phe-
nomenon of the judicial conduct commission, see I. TESITOR & D. SINKS, JUDICIAL CONDUCT
ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1980), but these commissions do not constitute much of an external
control. In the first place, it is probably inaccurate in this context to categorize these com-
missions as external controls on the judicial profession in light of the fact that ultimately
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check on their views is often necessary. Indeed, the question of
how to determine whether or not a particular type of decision
should be termed a "medical" one actually should depend upon
the degree and form of external control which is deemed neces-
sary on the medical profession. This decision, in turn, necessitates
a determination of the type of decisionmaking that should be used
for a particular issue. Obviously an accurate decision is desired,
but there are many possible definitions of accuracy, even where,
as here, "individual" disputes rather than polycentric disputes are
involved. 171 The substantive questions at issue here are fundamen-
tal ones concerning the way in which the affected person will be
able to live, at least for the short term. Normally, that person, if
an adult, is considered to be able to make the most accurate deci-
sion of how his or her life should be lived; the person's own views,
in other words, set the standard of accuracy. If the person is in-
competent, an effort is still made to make the decision on the basis
of what the affected person would want by having a guardian be
the decisionmaker. The guardian presumably tries to make the
decision on the basis of a type of "expert knowledge" of what the
affected person would choose to do if competent. Even though
the authority over the commissions rests with judges, usually those of a state's highest
court. See id. at 3. Moreover, the commissions are not a check on any particular decision.
See People ex rel. Harrod v. Illinois Courts Commission, 69 Ill. 2d 445, 372 N.E.2d 53
(1978). For purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to note that the overall conduct of a
judge might be subject to some outside control, but not the decisionmaking authority in a
specific instance. This is generally true of the other even less viable controls such as recall
or impeachment. Even judges who must face the voters view re-election as a control on
their individual decisionmaking in only the rarest of cases.
For some decisions, especially in criminal cases, the jury may be viewed as an external
control. Admittedly, the judge exercises varying degrees of control over the jury even
though the jury technically is the ultimate decisionmaker. See, e.g., FED. IL Civ. P. 50. This
constitutes a type of dual decisionmaking somewhat analogous to that suggested infra notes
174-77 and accompanying text. Yet for many other decisions, sentencing being a prime
example, there may be no outside check on the judicial profession, although even for sen-
tencing it has been argued that the judge is not an "expert" and that he shares this respon-
sibility with experts such as probation officers and penologists. P. DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 22-34
(1979). There are, then, many decisions which, under the analysis here, would have to be
viewed as involving issues appropriately considered internal to the particular knowledge of
judges. See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text. Whether and how one can justify
assigning such a large number of decisions and issues to the domain of judges' special
knowledge is a complex and intriguing question that is beyond the scope of this Article.
171. For a discussion of similar issues in the context of polycentric disputes, see Boyer,
supra note 43, at 124-30.
172. Actually, it may be quite difficult for anyone to make the decision on any basis
other than what he himself thinks is best. See R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS (1979).
PSYCHIATRIST AS DECISIONMAKER
there is a surrogate decisionmaker, theoretically the standard of
''accuracy" still is that of the affected person's own wishes.
Most of this Article, however, has addressed the decisionmak-
ing process in instances in which the wishes of the affected person
do not set the standard of accuracy. At this point, at least two
other possible standards of "accuracy," or different criteria for
making the decision, become relevant. Trying to base our decision
on the "best" current scientific view of the issue is one possibility.
Alternatively, a look toward the mythical "reasonable man,"
which in this context is probably the equivalent of a person pos-
sessing "common-sense," might be employed. Recognized experts,
such as psychiatrists, base their decisions on what they believe the
best currently accepted knowledge dictates, and thus incorporate
the basic premises of their field into the process. Decisionmakers
looking to the reasonable man standard try to reach their deci-
sions on the basis of what, in their view, most "rational" members
of our society would deem correct. It is a decision based on this
latter standard of accuracy which, in effect, Morse is advocating.
Indeed, this "common-sense" standard should play the dominant
role for many decisions in the area of mental health law. But once
one accepts that legal procedures raise issues which may exceed
anyone's knowledge, it seems evident-more so than Morse would
concede-that the "scientific" standard must play a necessary part
in the decisionmaking process.
Still remaining, though, is the question of why a judge can
apply the "reasonable man" standard and represent "society"
while a psychiatrist cannot. In one sense, neither the psychiatric
nor the judicial decisionmaker is representative of the "common
man"-even if there were such a thing-as it might be argued a
jury is. Both are by definition professionals. For the most part,
they are "representative" of only a small socio-economic segment
of our society. Whatever decisionmaking they both engage in on
behalf of "society" is justified on the basis of their having some
superior knowledge and training.
To a substantial degree, nevertheless, the judicial deci-
sionmaker can effectuate the purpose of the "reasonable man"
standard of "accuracy" whereas the psychiatric decisionmaker
cannot. Ironically, the psychiatrist is unqualified for this role for
much the same reason an expert is generally deemed qualified: his
or her possession of special expertise. The judge is a non-specialist
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on the technical or scientific dimensions of these issues, whereas
the psychiatrist is a specialist. One might contend that this means
we should be more doubtful about the judge's ability to under-
stand and reach an accurate decision about a matter in which the
judge has no particular scientific expertise. At one level this is
true. Nevertheless, as a non-specialist the judge can better act as a
representative of a broader segment of society's views on the mat-
ter. At the same time, the views of the expert will certainly play
an important part in reaching the final decision. But there needs
to be some check on that expertise, on that specialized bias, and it
is not provided by due process requirements of neutrality. Indeed,
it cannot be expected to come from within the profession because,
although there are exceptions, 17 basically all members of the pro-
fession agree with the underlying principles to which the profes-
sion is rooted. This is an inherent part of their expertise, an in-
herent part of any science . 7  A part of the socialization of a new
professional is the internalization of these basic premises. 7 5
As the non-specialists on these matters, judges can represent a
more varied spectrum of thoughts-less-informed thoughts, but
certainly more varied. Judges can act as a check on psychiatric
opinion by setting the outer limits of what the non-expert mem-
bers of society will accept no matter what the technical experts
believe. The control needed is some non-psychiatrist with the au-
173. At present, the best known psychiatrist who would probably qualify as such an
exception is Thomas Szasz. See, e.g., T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
174. "Paradigm formation is fundamental to science as a social process. Without the
personal commitment of individual scientists to the same world picture, there could be no
communication, no basis for criticism, no criteria for consensuality." J. ZIMAN, RELIABLE
KNOWLEDGE 90 (1978). "Thus scientific knowledge in any era is what the scientists actively
take as such, and the scientific knowledge of one era may be rejected as error in the next."
H. BROWN, PERCEPTION, THEORY AND COMMrrMENT 151 (1977). See also S. BUCHANAN, TRUTH
IN THE ScIENCES (1972).
175. "The aim of a professional scientific education is to develop the ability to live at
ease within the current scientific consensus-to 'think physically' (or 'chemically', or 'bio-
logically') as we dons like to put it. Experience has shown that it is practically impossible to
contribute to physics, or chemistry, or geology, or physiology until one has become a 'phys-
icist', or a 'chemist', or a 'geologist', or a 'physiologist' by internalizing the paradigm of
one's subject." J. ZIMAN, supra note 174, at 90.
"[S]ocialization involves becoming the values, language, behavior patterns, and beliefs
of a social group which have a relatively enduring impact on how a person conducts
him-or herself.. . . Socialization differs from learning, whether one is learning knowl-
edge, skills or roles, because it indicates a personal involvement and absorption that 'learn-
ing' does not." D. LIGHT, supra note 105, at 326. Because of the nature of psychiatric
training, this internalization is "unusually thorough." Id. at 256.
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thority of society to say: "Wait a minute. That's not right. We're
not going to do that no matter what people in your profession
say." Psychiatrists as specialists cannot provide much of a check
on each other at the broadest level. There can be bitter debate
and disagreement within the profession, but the outside check
provided by someone with an open perspective-even if an unin-
formed one-is still needed. 17 6 For, as recognized in a more gen-
eral context, "[t]he expert-who ought to know better .. . is
often more credulous than the layman concerning the foundation
of his knowledge."' 7
We should be careful, however, not to be too glib about the
efficacy of relying upon common sense, because "[c]ommon-sense
conclusions, particularly about human nature, are not necessarily
the embodiment of the wisdom of the ages." 178 It might be that in
some situations we do not need or want the check of the person
who lacks knowledge of and belief in the basic principles of the
field. These are disputes that raise issues that should be left solely
to the internal processes of expert knowledge. For our particular
inquiry, they constitute the true "medical decisions."' Yet saying
that there may be such instances is much easier than identifying
which they are.
The question of who should be the decisionmaker when an
involuntarily hospitalized patient refuses psychotropic medication
presents one such hard case. On the one hand, even an indepen-
dent psychiatrist is likely to share the approach, perspective, and
biases of the treating doctor.1 80 The utility and desirability of
medicating patients is one of the deeply ingrained aspects of most
176. "Each person [psychiatric resident] absorbs these common elements, yet crafts
them in a way that suits his or her style .... From an inside perspective, this gives the
impression of eclectic diversity, just as an outside perspective may perceive uniformity. By
the nature of the process, both are right." D. LIGHT, supra note 105, at 237.
177. J. ZIMAN, supra note 174, at 91.
178. Diamond & Louisell, supra note 57, at 1343.
179. The Supreme Court has recently decided, in effect, that the question of what
minimally adequate training is due involuntarily hospitalized mentally retarded patients
should be a matter committed solely to the domain of the "experts," and thus held that
professional decisions are "presumptively valid" and that "liability may be imposed only
when the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted profes-
sional judgment, practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actu-
ally did not base the decision on such a judgment." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
323 (1982).
180. Brooks, supra note 27, at 199.
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modern psychiatry, especially as practiced in public hospitals."'
The use of such medication can have serious physical conse-
quences and can infringe on basic notions of autonomy and pri-
vacy. On the other hand, this still may not be the type of decision
for which we need the check of the non-specialist. The question of
the person's mental illness will have already been determined.
The question is reduced to the type and level of treatment that
can be used against the patient's desires. Is this just a "technical"
question-that is, one that should be resolved by an independent
expert decisionmaker without an outside check on the profession?
It is very hard to say. Perhaps Alexander Brooks is right when he
comments that many of the concerns about the use of medication
in state hospitals which might cause one to seek a check on the
psychiatric profession on this issue (such as actual selection of
medication by nurses or attendants) are, to a great extent, the re-
sult of the failure of of the psychiatric profession to regulate it-
self.8 2 This suggests that the problem is not the inherent nature
of the professional beliefs, but the lack of adherence to the dic-
tates of the best of these beliefs. If this is true, it might be appro-
priate to have truly independent psychiatrists act as deci-
sionmakers for disputes about refusals to accept medication.
C. Form of the External Control
Once the necessity of an outside control on psychiatrists is ac-
cepted, the issue becomes what form that control should take.
Perhaps the psychiatrist should be left unconstrained as the initial
decisionmaker, subject soley to the external check of judicial re-
view. This is the general policy in the analogous situation of ad-
ministrative-agency decisions.1 83 Indeed, it has been argued that
the due process requirement is primarily designed just to provide
an adequate record for review.""
Such external control, however, would not be suffi-
cient-particularly under the current standard of substantial evi-
dence on the record as a whole. This Article has suggested that
181. Id. at 182, 200; DuBose, Of the Parens Patriae Commitment Power and Drug Treat-
ment of Schizophrenia: Do the Benefits to the Patient Justify Involuntary Treatment?, 60 MXNN. L,
Rav. 1149, 1167-68 (1976).
182. Brooks, supra note 27, at 208, 214.
183. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982).
184. McCormack, supra note 85.
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the non-expert should question the expert's findings whenever
they seem too distant from his or her own common sense. As has
been noted,18 5 however, one of the serious problems today is that
many judges do not provide much of a check on the psychiatrist
even when the judge is the actual decisionmaker., There is even
less likelihood that they would do so when there is only a "cold
record" to review rather than an ability to see, hear, and question
the expert. It is therefore at the fact-finder stage where this type
of societal "veto" power should be placed, the type of power exer-
cised by the jury in criminal cases. Traditionally, the jury is seen
as exercising a common-sense check by using its power of nullifi-
cation and, in effect, rejecting the legal standard""6 whenever it
believes that "the law" is inappropriate or simply wrong. This
same function needs to be performed by the non-expert who
could reject the "science" of the psychiatric expert.
18 7
Finally, judicial review as a means of control would be insuffi-
cient in the quantity as well as the quality of control it would pro-
vide if used. The check needs to be more pervasive- than one
which would result in the relatively rare instances where some
party would endure the time and expense of judicial review. The
external control on the psychiatric expert should be a part of each
decision and not just exist as a generalized control over a category
or type of decision.8 ' Thus, in those situations where the outside
check is desired, the ultimate decisionmaker should be the non-
specialist.18 9 Even where only expert testimony is to be offered,
there is a strong reason to prefer that the expert enter the process
185. See supra note 6.
186. "The jury's fundamental function is not only to guard against official departures
from the rules of law, but on proper occasions themselves to depart from unjust rules and
their unjust application." M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 53-54 (1973).
187. In somewhat the same vein, Alan Stone has included in his thought-provoking
suggested standard for civil commitment a provision requiring the determination that a
"reasonable man" would choose hospitalization under the particular circumstances of the
case at issue. A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 67 (1975).
188. Admittedly, it might be possible to have a joint tribunal consisting of an expert
and legally trained (and/or) lay decisionmakers similar to that used for malpractice claims.
See Friedman, Arbitration in Medical Malpractice, 13 TRIAL 49 (Aug. 1977). But that would
mean there would still have to be the presentation of experts as witnesses and the added
expense of a joint tribunal.
189. Perhaps the non-specialist decisionmaker should not hear only mental health
cases for any long period of time in order to try to retain more of the common-sense
check. See C. WARREN, THE COURT OF LAST RESORT 212-13 (1982).
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in the form of a witness rather than a decisionmaker. As such,
there is some sense to the solution suggested by Justice Brennan
in Parham wherein a judicial proceeding would be held which, in
effect, would resolve an issue based solely on hearing the opinions
of psychiatrists.190 Even in situations in which only an impartial
court-appointed expert testifies, the non-specialist still should be
the decisionmaker if an effective external control on psychiatric
expertise is to be maintained, even when the parties are not al-
lowed to cross-examine the expert. There is value in having the
expert appear as witness rather than decisionmaker beyond the
fact that it gives the parties an opportunity to explore and chal-
lenge the expert's views. This opportunity is undoubtedly impor-
tant and aids whatever hope there is of having the non-specialist
act as an effective check on that expert. But the actual check of
the non-specialist decisionmaker is in fact an independent one that
is not inherently connected to the adversary system. The adver-
sary system provides many protections, but the protection of an
adequate external control on psychiatric expertise can be pro-
vided only by having the actual decisionmaker be a non-expert.
CONCLUSION
It is important to recognize that the psychiatric expert is al-
most always a part of the decisionmaking process in cases involv-
ing mental health issues. Even when the expert is put in the role
of witness with a linited ability to express an opinion on the "ulti-
mate" issue, he or she, in reality, shares in the decisionmaking.
This does not mean, however, that there is no significance to
whether" the psychiatrist participates as witness rather than deci-
sionmaker. Whether psychiatrists can meet the most basic levels of
independence and neutrality required of due process deci-
sionmakers, even when using their own decisionmaking proce-
dures, is not a legitimate concern. They can satisfy these require-
ments as they are currently formulated. Nevertheless, there is still
a need for an outside check by a person who is not a specialist in
this "science" who will better reflect the broader, societal interest
on mental health issues. By making the psychiatrist the witness
rather than the decisionmaker, there is hope that the needed con-
190. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 637-38 (1979).
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trol will be exerted on the views of this expert and on the psychi-
atric profession as a whole.

